This paper estimates a New Keynesian model with matching frictions and nominal wage rigidities on UK data. The estimation enables the identi…cation of important structural parameters of the British economy, the recovery of the unobservable shocks that a¤ected the UK economy since 1975 and the study of the transmission mechanism. Results show that with matching frictions, wage rigidities have limited e¤ect on in ‡ation dynamics, despite improving the empirical performance of the model. The reason is the following. With matching frictions, marginal costs depend on unit labour costs and on an additional component related to search costs. Wage rigidities a¤ect both components in opposite ways leaving marginal costs and in ‡a-tion virtually una¤ected.
in ‡ation. A growing number of empirical studies document that embedding labour market frictions into a standard New Keynesian model increases the model's empirical performance and enables a more accurate description of in ‡ation dynamics. 2 The contribution of our paper is two-fold. First, we build on these previous studies to estimate a New Keynesian model characterised by labour market frictions using UK data. This estimation allows us to estimate the structural parameters of the UK economy, the unobservable shocks and study their transmission mechanism. Second, we investigate how staggered wage negotiations a¤ect the propagation of shocks and the ability of the model to …t the data. To this end, the theoretical framework allows, but does not require, nominal wage rigidities to a¤ect the model's dynamics, therefore leaving the data to establish the importance of wage rigidities. In particular, this estimation strategy allows us to investigate the e¤ect of nominal wage rigidities on in ‡ation dynamics.
Our …ndings are the following. First, we estimate important structural parameters of the labour market that characterise the British economy. In particular, we identify a relatively low Frish elasticity of labour supply, re ‡ecting the fact that employment is more volatile along the extensive margin than the intensive margin. The estimate of the ratio of the income value of non working activity over wages is about 77%. As pointed out by Costain and Reiter (2008) , this estimate is consistent with a semielasticity of unemployment to unemployment insurance equal to 2, which is in line with empirical evidence. This …nding casts doubt on the argument by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) that a high opportunity cost of working be a plausible solution of the unemployment volatility puzzle in the UK. Similar results have been obtained by Gertler et al. (2008) using US data. The elasticity of the matching function with respect to unemployment is equal to 0.55, lower than the estimates of 0.7 in Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) , suggesting that the number of new hires equally depends on the number of unemployed workers as well the number of vacancies posted. The estimate of the job destruction rate is approximately equal to 7%, higher than the estimates from microdata which range from 3%, as estimated by Bell and Smith (2002) , to 4.5%, as given by Hobijn and Sahin (2007) . We also provide estimates for the monetary authority's reaction function. We …nd that the monetary authority's response to in ‡ation is particularly strong and there is a mild degree of interest rate inertia, while the response to output ‡uctuations is robust.
The estimated model allows us to characterise the transmission of shocks. We investigate how the model variables react to supply and demand shocks, and we …nd that shocks to preferences and the labour supply are more important than technology and monetary policy shocks in explaining the data. Finally, using a Kalman …lter on the model's reduced form we provide estimates for the unobservable shocks that characterised the post 1970s British economy. In general, we …nd that the magnitude of shocks has somewhat decreased since the mid-1990s, with the exception of preferences shocks, whose size has remained broadly unchanged. Furthermore, similarly to studies for other countries, we …nd that the volatility of monetary policy shocks declined after the mid-1990s. These …ndings corroborate the results of empirical studies, such as Benati (2007) and Bianchi et al. (2009) , which detected a period of macroeconomic stability triggered by a lower volatility of shocks in the UK during the past decade.
We establish that staggered wage setting enables the model to …t the data more closely. We …nd that although a positive degree of staggered wage setting is supported by the data, the model is unable to precisely identify the frequency of wage adjustment. Nominal wage rigidities make wage dynamics more subdued, and have important implications for labour market dynamics. For instance, in the staggered wage speci…cation vacancies fall in reaction to a positive technology shock as prices fall at a faster pace than wages, inducing an increase in the real wage and a reduction in the value of a job to the …rm.
Similarly to Krause and Lubik (2007) , we …nd that at the estimated equilibrium wage rigidities are irrelevant for in ‡ation dynamics, despite being important in characterising labour market dynamics. In a frictional labour market in ‡ation depends on unit labour costs and on an additional term which is related to labour market frictions, that is, to the expected change in the search costs incurred in …nding a match. Following a shock, wage rigidities have a direct e¤ect on the unit labour cost. However, the contribution of unit labour costs to marginal costs is o¤set by the contribution of the component related to labour market frictions. We elaborate more on the intuition in the main text. This result holds for all the shocks in our model economy and stands in sharp contrast with those obtained in a New Keynesian models with competitive labour markets. Absent search frictions in the labour market, the dynamics of in ‡ation are only driven by the unit labour costs. It follows that wage rigidities generate in ‡ation persistence by making unit labour costs more persistent (see Christiano et al. 2005 ).
The paper is related to several studies. As in Krause and Lubik (2007) , Krause et al. (2008a Krause et al. ( , 2008b ), Ravenna and Walsh (2009) and Zanetti (2007a) , we internalise the importance of labour market frictions to describe in ‡ation dynamics, but we also extend the framework to incorporate and test the empirical relevance of staggered wage setting. In this respect, our approach is similar to Gertler et al. (2008) . However, our work di¤ers from theirs as we allow …rms to change the labour input along both the extensive and the intensive margin, and we simplify the modeling of wage rigidities following Thomas (2008) . Moreover, we show that by assuming that newly hired workers become immediately productive creates a channel from wages to in ‡ation without departing from e¢ cient bargaining on hours. As shown by Trigari (2006) , under e¢ cient bargaining on hours and a delay in the timing of the matching function, there is no link between wages and in ‡ation.
The intuition is straightforward: if it takes time for workers to contribute to production, …rms can change output only by changing hours. As a result, marginal costs will only depend on hours. But when hours are e¢ ciently bargained the marginal cost will depend only on the number of hours which is solely related to the ratio between marginal rate of substitution and the marginal product of labour, which in turn are independent from wages. In order to introduce a link between wages and in ‡ation, a number of authors have abandoned the assumption of e¢ cient bargaining to investigate the implications of right to manage (Christo¤el and We build on this literature by showing that a contemporaneous timing of the matching function restores a wage channel in the presence of e¢ cient bargaining on hours. However, we …nd that at the estimated equilibrium the wage channel is unable to a¤ect in ‡ation dynamics. Finally, di¤erently from all the aforementioned studies, we are the …rst to estimate a model with labour market frictions and nominal wage rigidities on the UK economy.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 sets up the model and details the speci…cation of marginal costs. Section 3 presents the results of the estimation. Section 4 uses impulse-response functions to lay out the transmission mechanism of the model. It then evaluates the importance of each shock in explaining the dynamics of the endogenous variables, and …nally uses the reduced form of the model to recover the dynamics of the unobserved shocks. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
The model
The model combines the search and matching framework in Krause et al. (2008a) with the staggered wage setting mechanism in Thomas (2008) . The economy consists of households, …rms, comprised of a continuum of producers indexed by j 2 [0; 1] and retailers, a monetary and …scal authority. In what follows we explain the structure of the labour market and the problems faced by households and …rms. We conclude by detailing the speci…cation of marginal costs.
The labour market
The matching of workers and …rms is established by the standard matching function M (U t ; V t ) = mU t V 1 t , which represents the aggregate ‡ow of hires in a unit period 3 . The variable U t denotes aggregate unemployment and V t aggregate vacancies, m > 0 captures matching e¢ ciency and 0 < < 1 denotes the elasticity of the matching function with respect to unemployment. During each period, vacancies are …lled with probability q( t ) = M t =V t ; where t = V t =U t denotes labour market tightness. Constant returns to scale in the matching function imply that workers …nd a job with probability t q( t ):
We assume that new hires start working at the beginning of each period t, and at the end of each period a constant fraction of workers loses the job with probability : Consequently, the evolution of aggregate employment N t is 4 :
Workers who lose the job at time t 1 can look for a job at the beginning of time t: The stock of workers searching for a job at time t is therefore given by the number of workers who did not work in t 1, 1 N t 1 ; plus those who lost their job at the end of the period, N t 1 . The evolution of aggregate unemployment is written:
Households
The economy is populated by a unit measure of households whose members can be either employed or unemployed. We follow Merz (1995) and Andolfatto (1996) in assuming that members of the representative household perfectly insure each other against ‡uctuations in income. The problem of the representative household is to maximise an expected utility function of the form
where is the discount factor, t is a preference shock and t is a labour supply shock. The variable c t denotes consumption of the representative household at time t, while C t 1 denotes aggregate consumption in period t 1, and & is an index of external habits. The variable n jt denotes the number of household members employed in …rm j; and h jt denotes the corresponding number of hours. The parameter governs the degree of risk aversion and is the inverse of the Frish elasticity 3 Note that Ut = R 1 0 ujtdj and Vt = R 1 0 jtdj:
of labour supply. Consumption c t is a Dixit Stiglitz aggregator of a bundle of di¤erentiated goods:
where t is the stochastic elasticity of substitution among di¤erentiated goods. Denoting by p jt the price of a variety produced by a monopolistic competitor j; the expenditure minimising price index associated with the representative consumption bundle c t is:
The household faces the following budget constraint:
which dictates that expenditure, on the left-hand side (LHS), must equal income, on the right-hand side (RHS). The household'expenditure is investment, I t , consumption, c t , and the acquisition of bonds, B t =p t . Households' income is the stock of bonds B t 1 from previous period t 1 which pay a gross nominal interest rate R t 1 , the proceedings from working in …rm j,
! jt n jt h jt dj, and the unemployed bene…ts, b, earned by each unemployed member of the household. In addition, the household earns proceedings from renting capital, k t , to the …rms at the rate r k t , the dividends from owning the …rms, d t , and the net government transfer T t .
The household chooses c t ; B t and k t+1 to maximise the utility function (2), subject to the budget constraint in equation (3) and the law of motion for capital,
where k denotes the rate of capital depreciation. By substituting equation (4) into (3), and letting t denote the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint, the …rst order conditions with respect to c t ; B t and k t+1 are:
where t+1 = p t+1 =p t denotes the gross in ‡ation rate. Equation (5) states that the Lagrange multiplier equals the marginal utility of consumption. Equations (6) and (7), once equation (5) is substituted in, are the household's Euler equations that describe the consumption and capital decisions respectively.
To conclude the description of the household we need to de…ne the marginal value of being employed and unemployed. The marginal value of employment at …rm j, W E jt ; is given by:
which states that the marginal value of a job for a worker is given by the real wage net of the disutility of work plus the expected-discounted value from being either employed or unemployed in the following period. The marginal value of unemployment, W U t ; is:
where
dj is the expected value of employment outside the …rm in t + 1: This equation states that the marginal value of unemployment is the sum of unemployment bene…ts plus the expected-discounted value from being either employed or unemployed in t + 1. Using equations (8) and (9) we determine the household's net value of employment at …rm j, W E jt W U t , denoted by W jt , as:
Firms
We assume two types of …rms: producers and retailers. Producers hire workers in a frictional labour market and rent capital in a perfectly competitive market. They manufacture a homogeneous intermediate good and sell it to retailers in a perfectly competitive market. Retailers transform intermediate inputs from the production sector into di¤erentiated goods and sell them to consumers.
As it is standard in the New Keynesian literature, we assume staggered price adjustment à la Calvo (1983) . In what follows we describe the problems of the producers and retailers in detail.
Producers
There is a continuum of producers of unit measure selling homogeneous goods at the competitive price ' t . During each period, …rm j manufactures y jt units of goods according to the following production technology y jt = A t (n jt h jt ) k 1 jt , where A t is a stochastic variable capturing shocks to total factor productivity. We assume constant returns to scale in production implying that all …rms have the same capital-labour ratio k jt =n jt h jt = k t =n t h t for all j. Consequently, the marginal product of labour is also equalised across …rms such that mpl jt = mpl t :
Firms open vacancies at time t to choose employment in the same period; the cost of opening a vacancy is C(v jt ) = av "c jt ; where a > 0 is a scaling factor and " c > 1 is the elasticity of hiring costs with respect to vacancies: The vacancy cost function is assumed to be convex in order to produce an equilibrium where all the …rms post vacancies. If the vacancy cost function were linear all …rms would face the same marginal vacancy posting cost. Since we assume staggered wage negotiations, it follows that only the …rm with the lowest wage would hire at equilibrium. In our model wage dispersion implies that …rms with high wages face low marginal return from search and low marginal vacancy posting costs since they hire only a relatively small number of workers.
The problem of the …rm is to choose v jt , n jt and k jt+1 to maximise the present value of future discounted pro…ts:
subject to the production function and the law of motion for employment:
Since households own the …rms, future pro…ts are discounted at the rate s t+s = t : Letting J jt denote the Lagrange multiplier on the employment constraint (11), the …rst order conditions with respect to k jt+1 , v jt and n jt are:
Equation (12) implies that returns to capital equalize the marginal revenue product. Equation (13) implies that the per period cost of …lling a vacancy C 0 (v jt ) times the average vacancy duration 1=q ( t ) must equal the shadow value of employment J jt : Equation (14) shows that the shadow value of employment to the …rm equals current period pro…ts, i.e., the marginal revenue product of employment net of wage costs, plus the continuation value. Substituting equation (13) into equation (14) yields the standard job creation condition:
which states that the cost of hiring an additional worker (LHS) equals the marginal bene…t (RHS) that the additional worker brings into the …rm.
Retailers
There is a unit measure of retailers who transform homogeneous goods from the production sector into di¤erentiated goods. Monopolistic competition implies that each retailer j faces the following demand for its own product
where c t is aggregate demand of the consumption bundle. Each retailer produces c jt units of output using the same amount of inputs from the production sector. We assume price stickiness à la Calvo (1983) , meaning that during each period a random fraction of …rms, p , are not allowed to reset their price.
The problem of the retailers is to choose p jt to maximise:
subject to the demand function (16) . The optimal pricing decision is:
where p t is the optimal price chosen by all …rms renegotiating at time t. This implies that forward looking …rms choose the optimal price such that the time-varying mark-up is equal to t = ( t 1).
Since …rms are randomly selected to change price, the law of motion for the aggregate price level is:
Wage bargaining
Similarly to the price setting decision, we assume staggered wage negotiations, meaning that each period only a random fraction of …rms, w , is allowed to renegotiate on wages. Following Thomas (2008) we assume that the wage set by the renegotiating …rm j satis…es the following sharing rule:
where is the bargaining power of the workers and the superscript * denotes renegotiating workers and …rms. This sharing rule implies that renegotiating workers obtain a fraction of the total surplus equal to their bargaining power.
Notice that this is di¤erent from Nash bargaining. With Nash bargaining wages maximise a weighted average of the joint surplus. Nash bargaining delivers the sharing rule, equation (19) , only if wages are continuously renegotiated. As shown by Gertler and Trigari (2009) , in an economy with staggered wage negotiations Nash bargaining implies that, in the presence of staggered wage negotiations, the share parameter in equation (19) ‡uctuates over the cycle. This follows from the fact that workers and …rms face di¤erent time horizons when they consider the e¤ects of di¤erent wages. However, Gertler and Trigari (2009) suggest that this 'horizon e¤ect' has quantitatively negligible implications. We therefore choose to follow Thomas (2008) and adopt the sharing rule in equation (19) as it simpli…es the analysis considerably.
With staggered wage negotiations, the shadow value of employment at …rm j to the household that is allowed to renegotiate can be rewritten from equation (10) as follows:
where the worker's opportunity cost of holding the job,! jt , is equal to:
The net value of employment to the household conditional on wage renegotiation at time t (eq. (20)), equals the net ‡ow income from employment, ! jt h jt ! jt , plus the continuation value, which is the last term on the RHS. The latter is equal to the sum of the marginal discounted value of employment in t + 1 conditional on the wage set a time t, if the …rm does not renegotiate with probability w , and the value of employment in t+1 conditional on a renegotiation, with probability 1 w : Similarly, the shadow value of employment to the renegotiating …rm j can be written:
where ! jt = ' t mpl t h jt denotes the marginal revenue product: The marginal value of employment for a renegotiating …rm equals the net ‡ow value of the match plus the continuation value. In turn, this equals the marginal value of employment in t + 1 conditional on the previous period wage, with probability w , and the marginal value conditional on a wage renegotiation, with probability 1 w . Iterating equations (20) and (21) forward it is possible to rewrite them as follows:
Using the sharing rule in equation (19), (22) and (23) imply that:
where ! tar jt+s = ! jt+s + (1 )! jt+s is the total wage payment to the worker on which both parties would agree if wages were fully ‡exible: Substituting for ! jt+s and! jt+s the target real wage bill can be written:
Equation (25) is standard in the search and matching literature. The target real wage bill is expressed as a weighted average between the marginal revenue product of the worker and the opportunity cost of holding a job at the level of hours worked h jt . Given that renegotiating …rms are randomly chosen, the law of motion for the aggregate wage is given by:
Hours bargaining
We assume that hours and wages are bargained simultaneously and that bargaining on hours is e¢ cient. Hence, hours satisfy the Nash bargaining criterion:
Using the sharing rule (19) , the …rst order condition becomes:
This equation states that the marginal rate of substitution, on the LHS, equals the marginal product of hours, on the RHS. Since the marginal return to the labour input is equalised across …rms at equilibrium, it follows that members of the household employed in di¤erent …rms work the same amount of hours, i.e., h jt = h t : Solving the …rst order condition for hours yields:
Price and wage in ‡ation
Following Calvo (1983), using equations (17) and (18) we derive the standard New Keynesian
Phillips Curve:
where a hat superscript denotes the variable's deviation from its steady-state, and the coe¢ cient k p is equal to:
Similarly, following Thomas (2008) , using equation (24) and (26) we obtain the following equation
for wage in ‡ation:
where the coe¢ cient k w is equal to:
Equation (29) states that wage in ‡ation depends on the gap between the actual and target real wage bill,! t +ĥ t and! tar t , respectively. In ‡ation materialises whenever the real wage bill is below target, that is, whenever the wage bill is below the level that would prevail if wages were perfectly ‡exible. The Appendix reports the derivation of the wage Phillips curve, equation (29) .
Closing the model
The monetary authority sets the nominal interest rate following the Taylor rule:
where an asterisk superscript denotes the steady state values of the associated variables. The parameter r represents interest rate smoothing, and r y and r govern the response of the monetary authority to deviations of output and in ‡ation from their steady state value. The error term " R t denotes an i.i.d. monetary policy shock.
The …scal authority is assumed to run a balanced budget:
Marginal costs
In this section we compare the speci…cation of marginal costs in our model against alternative formulations in the literature. This is important to unveil some key properties of the model and understand the …ndings detailed in the next section. Trigari (2006) shows that whenever …rms post vacancies at time t to control employment in the following period, the matching model with e¢ cient bargaining on hours lacks a transmission channel from wages to prices since the real marginal cost is independent from wages. The intuition is straightforward. Since current hires contribute to next period employment, in the current period …rms can change production only by adjusting hours. This implies that the marginal cost of production depends solely on hours. With e¢ cient bargaining the number of hours worked is determined by the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure and the marginal product of labour, and therefore it is independent from wages. It follows that wages are irrelevant for marginal costs. to manage. In our model we are able to restore a wage channel while preserving e¢ cient Nash bargaining. We do so by changing the timing assumption of the matching function. That is, we allow …rms to control employment at time t by choosing vacancies in the same period, as described by equation (11) . Under this timing assumption, the cost of increasing production at the margin depends on the cost of hiring an additional worker, which is represented by the wage paid to the new hire. This can be seen by solving the job creation condition in equation (14) for marginal costs
where mpe t = A t (n jt h jt ) 1 k 1 jt h jt denotes the marginal product of employment. From equation (30) , as shown by Krause and Lubik (2007) , real marginal costs are equal to the sum of the unit labour cost and an additional term related to matching frictions. Given that the shadow value of employment J t equals the expected hiring cost, the second term on the RHS of equation (30) can be interpreted as the expected change in search costs. By equation (13) , this term depends on the expected value of labour market tightness in the next period relative to the current period. If we had assumed that newly hired workers were unable to contribute to production immediately, the decision on vacancies would only a¤ect next period marginal costs, leaving current period marginal costs depend solely on the number of hours, which, due to e¢ cient wage bargaining, are independent from wages.
Estimation
The model is estimated with Bayesian methods. It is …rst loglinearised around the deterministic steady state. We then solve the model and apply the Kalman …lter to evaluate the likelihood function of the observable variables. The likelihood function and the prior distribution of the parameters are combined to obtain the posterior distributions. The posterior kernel is simulated numerically using the Metropolis-Hasting algorithm. We …rst discuss the data and the priors used in the estimation and then report the parameter estimates.
Priors and data
The model is estimated over the period 1975Q1-2009Q1 using …ve shocks and …ve data series. We use quarterly observations of real output scaled by the labour force. Real GDP is measured as seasonally adjusted gross value added at basic prices. In ‡ation is measured as percentage changes of the implied GDP de ‡ator. We also use series on average hours, employment in heads and Bank rates. All series, with the exception of the Bank rate, are passed through a Hodrick-Prescott …lter with smoothing parameter 1600.
The …ve shocks in the model are a preference shock, a mark-up shock, a labour supply shock, a technology shock and a monetary policy shock. All shocks, with the exception of monetary policy shock, are assumed to follow a …rst-order autoregressive process with i.i.d. normal error terms such that ln t+1 = ln t + t , where the shock 2 f ; ; ; Ag, 0 < < 1 and t N (0; ) :
Monetary policy shocks " R t are i.i.d. Some parameters are …xed, while other are estimated. We start by discussing the …xed parameters. The discount factor is set at 0.99 implying a real interest rate of 4%. Capital depreciation k is set at 0.025, to match an average annual rate of capital destruction of 10%, and at 0.69 to match the labour share over the period of the estimation. The habits parameter, &, the bargaining power of the workers, , and the elasticity of the vacancy cost function, " c , are also …xed, due to identi…cation problems. Consequently, the habits parameter is then calibrated at 0.5, a value lying in the mid range of the estimates reported in the literature for the UK economy, as detailed in The remaining parameters are all estimated. We use the beta distribution for parameters that take sensible values between zero and one, the gamma distribution for coe¢ cients restricted to be positive and the inverse gamma distribution for the shock variances. Tables B and C report priors, posterior estimates and 90% con…dence intervals.
The unemployment bene…ts coe¢ cient, b, is calibrated to match a replacement ratio of 0:38 as in Nickell (1997) . This parameter is important to generate ampli…cation of labour market variables.
As shown by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) , values of b close to unity generate responses of unemployment and vacancies to productivity shocks that are close to the data. When b is high, the value of a job to the worker is very close to the value of unemployment. In this case the surplus of a job is very small and tiny changes in the productivity of the labour input produce a high change in the total surplus of a match, boosting the response of employment. However, as detailed below, Costain and Reiter (2008) show that a high value of b is empirically implausible. For this reason we choose a prior value for b which is low enough not to generate an additional source of ampli…cation.
The prior of the elasticity of the matching function, , is set to 0:7, as estimated by Petrongolo Finally, we choose the prior mean of the Taylor rule response to in ‡ation, r = 1:5, and to output r y = 0:5: While the former value is standard in the literature, the latter is somewhat higher than the typically reported values. Our reason for a relatively high value of r y lies in the identi…cation problems related to the use of more moderate priors. The model favours high values for r y and does not appear to be identi…ed for relatively low values of this prior. The prior mean of the interest rate smoothing parameter is set to 0.5. Table B shows posterior means of the structural parameters together with 90% con…dence intervals.
Parameter estimates
The posterior mean of the unemployment bene…t parameter equal to 0.6 is substantially di¤erent from its prior of 0.38. At the estimated equilibrium, the replacement ratio, computed as the sum of unemployment bene…ts and the disutility of working over the wage, equals 0.77. This is remarkably close to the value of 0.75 suggested by Costain and Reiter (2008) , which is consistent with an estimated semielasticity of unemployment to unemployment bene…ts around 2. This result suggests that a high opportunity cost of working is unlikely to be a valid explanation for the unemployment volatility puzzle, which is in line with the results obtained by Krause et al. (2008a) for the US economy.
The estimate of the inverse Frish elasticity of labour supply of 1.5 is considerably higher than the prior, and in line with microeconometric estimates. Since we use data on average hours, the parameter appears to be well identi…ed. The high estimate re ‡ects the fact that employment volatility is higher at the extensive margin than at the intensive margin. Krause et al. (2008a) obtain similar results for the US, although their estimate for is higher than ours.
The posterior means of the constant of the matching function, m, equal to 0.92 and the constant of the vacancy cost function, a, equal to 6.5 are similar to their prior means. The posterior mean of the rate of job separations, ; which is approximately equal to 0.7, is substantially higher than its prior. These results imply a higher rate of unemployment than under our baseline calibration. Each entry compares the responses of the model with ‡exible wages against those with sticky wages. Figure 1 shows that output raises in reaction to a positive technology shock and, due to the downward sloping demand curve, prices and in ‡ation fall. Lower in ‡ation triggers a lower nominal interest rate, which fosters consumption and investment. The qualitative reactions of these variables are similar in the ‡exible and staggered wage models. On the contrary, the presence of staggered wage setting introduces important di¤erences in the reaction of labour market variables.
Following the shock, real wages increase by more in the presence of nominal wage rigidities.
With sticky wages, price de ‡ation translates into higher real wages. With ‡exible wages, nominal wages fall, tempering the increase in real wages. It is noticeable that vacancies, employment and labour market tightness fall in the presence of sticky wages, while they raise when wages are ‡exible.
The intuition for this is straightforward. A technology shock increases both the marginal product of labour and the real wage. The di¤erence between these two determines the incentives for posting vacancies, as dictated by equation (15) . With sticky wages, real wages increase by more than the marginal product of labour, and remain elevated during the sluggish process of adjustment. With ‡exible wages instead, real wages increase below the marginal product of labour and freely adjust in the aftermath of the shock, preserving the …rms'incentives to post vacancies.
Even though wage rigidities a¤ect the transmission of technology shocks to labour market variables they are unable to produce sizeable changes to the dynamics of in ‡ation. Why are the in ‡ation dynamics similar in the two settings? As detailed in Section 2.8, search frictions introduce an additional term into marginal costs, over and above unit labour costs, which re ‡ects the expected change in search costs. Following a positive technology shock, nominal wage rigidities attenuate the drop in unit labour costs and amplify the fall in the frictional component of marginal costs compared to a ‡exible wage regime. As a result, marginal costs and in ‡ation dynamics behave similarly in the two settings. Wage rigidities attenuate the reaction of unit labour costs since real wages hold up on impact as …rms are not allowed to renegotiate lower wages. At the same time, as mentioned above, wage rigidities induce labour market tightness to fall on impact and then steadily increase.
As a result, the …rm's cost of searching for a worker falls on impact and it then raises over time. 5 The rising pro…le in expected search costs implies that the …rm can save on future hiring costs by increasing current period hiring. From equation (30), higher expected search costs next period, translate in lower marginal costs in the current period. As a result, the impact of wage rigidities on the frictional component of marginal costs compensates the impact on unit labour costs, leaving total marginal costs unchanged compared to the case of ‡exible wages. Figure 2 shows that a one-standard-deviation mark-up shock leads to an increase in in ‡ation.
As the interest rate increases, consumption and investment fall. In reaction to the shock, the …rm reduces the labour input along both the intensive and the extensive margin to decrease production.
Note that the qualitative responses of the variables in the staggered wage model are similar to those in the model with ‡exible wage setting, since mark-up shocks do not induce the …rm to adjust labour market variables di¤erently, as in the case of technology shocks. Nonetheless, similarly to the case of technology shocks, the reaction of marginal costs and in ‡ation remains substantially unchanged in the two settings. Figure 3 shows that one-standard-deviation labour supply shock reduces hours and exerts upward pressure on nominal wages by increasing the disutility of work. With ‡exible nominal wages, real wages increase, leading to a reduction in vacancies and employment. On the contrary, with staggered wage bargaining nominal wage in ‡ation is lower than price in ‡ation, which implies that real wages fall. Consequently, in the sticky wage model, vacancies and employment increase. With continuous wage negotiations higher nominal wage in ‡ation translates into higher price in ‡ation, which leads to higher interest rates and lower consumption and investment. Wage rigidities appear to have somewhat sizeable impact on marginal costs since the e¤ect produced through unit labour costs is only partially o¤set by the e¤ect of the frictional component of marginal costs. 5 Note that the average duration of a vacancy, 1=q( t), depends only on labour market tightness. Figure 4 shows that a one-standard-deviation monetary policy shock causes an increase in the nominal interest rate, and a fall in both in ‡ation and output. As in the cases of mark-up shocks, nominal wage rigidities do not alter the qualitative responses of the variables on impact, with the exception of the reaction of real wages. In both settings, in reaction to the shock, vacancies and employment fall, while in the presence of sticky wages price de ‡ation generates higher real wages.
When wages are continuously renegotiated instead, nominal wages fall at a faster pace than prices and real wages fall. Once again nominal wage rigidities have a di¤erent impact on unit labour costs in the two settings, whose movements are o¤set by the reaction of search costs. This generates similar marginal costs and price in ‡ation in the two settings. that is, the rate of unemployment that would be observed if prices and wages were perfectly ‡exible. Figure 7 shows that the unemployment gap, de…ned as the di¤erence between the actual and the natural rate of unemployment, increases drastically in recessionary periods. Figure 8 shows that the cyclical component of the log-unemployment rate is much less volatile in the ‡exible price economy than in the sticky price economy. As a consequence, the level of the unemployment rate that would be observed in a ‡exible price economy is not very di¤erent from what we could obtain by HP-…ltering the actual rate of unemployment (see Figure 9 ).
Conclusion
We have estimated a New Keynesian model characterized by labour market frictions on UK data to identify some key features of the UK economy. First, we estimated important structural parameters of the British economy, which enabled the investigation of the transmission mechanism of shocks and how it changes due to wage rigidities. We established that shocks to preferences and the labour supply are more important than technology, monetary policy, or mark-up shocks in explaining movements in the data. In addition, using a Kalman …lter on the model's reduced form we provided estimates for the unobserved shocks that characterised the post 1970s British economy. Similarly to studies for other countries, we found that the volatility of shocks declined after the mid-1990s, corroborating the evidence that this factor might have contributed to the macroeconomic stability of the past decade. 
Derivation of the wage Phillips curve.
A …rst order Taylor expansion on (24) yields:
Notice from equation (25) in the text that! (24) implies that ! jt = ! t : Equation (31) can be rewritten solving for ! t , and expressing the solution recursively:
The law of motion of the wage index in equation (26) can be rewritten as follows:
where wt = log ! t log ! t 1 : Using (33), equation (31) can be rewritten as:
Target wage bill
Marginal product of employment
Wage in ‡ation
Price in ‡ation
Taylor rule r t = r r t 1 + (1 r ) (r t + r yŷt ) +" 
